By Christian Schmidt
This ebook offers the large number of present contributions of video game conception to economics. The striking contributions fall extensively into different types. a few lay out in a jargon loose demeanour a selected department of the idea, the evolution of 1 of its ideas, or an issue, that runs via its improvement. Others are unique items of labor which are major to video game thought as a whole.
After taking the reader via a concise background of video game conception, the contributions contain such topics as:
*the connections among Von Neumann's mathematical video game concept and the area assigned to him today
*the strategic use of data via online game players
*the challenge of the coordination of strategic offerings among self sustaining players
*cooperative video games and their position in the literature of video games plus new advancements in non-cooperative games
*possible purposes for online game conception in business and fiscal economics differential qualitative video games and access dissuasion.
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Additional resources for Game Theory and Economic Analysis A Quiet Revolution in Economics
Example text
Dimand, R. , and Dimand, M. A. (1996), “From games of pure chance to strategic © 1995 Éditions Dalloz English edition: editorial matter and selection © 2002 Christian Schmidt; individual chapters © the contributors games: French probabilists and early game theory,” C. ) Uncertainty in Economic Thought. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 157–68. Dines, L. L. (1947), “On a theorem of Von Neumann,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA 33: 329–31. Dore, M. H. , and Goodwin, R. , eds (1989), John Von Neumann and Modern Economics.
In conclusion, the option retained by TGEB permits us to occult the distinction between cooperative and non-cooperative games. The case is not at all the same in the other option where, in the case of the two-person game, one is obliged to make the distinction between the cases where players cooperate and those in which they do not. The approach followed in TGEB leads to the following three categories of games: © 1995 Éditions Dalloz English edition: editorial matter and selection © 2002 Christian Schmidt; individual chapters © the contributors • • • Category 1: The zero-sum two-person game Category 2: The zero-sum n > 2-person games6 Category 3: The non-zero-sum n-person games These three categories are not homogenous.
Indeed on the one hand, the class of the non-cooperative games is the interpretive domain par excellence for the equilibrium point elaborated previously in order to solve the speculative facet of the Nash problem (see Nash 1950a). On the other hand, the class of non-cooperative games suggests an outlet to investigate the other facet of the question, namely the bargaining problem.