By Howard B. Schaffer
This can be the 1st systematic historical past of U.S. efforts to aid forge a payment among India and Pakistan at the Kashmir query. Former ambassador Howard B. Schaffer attracts on interviews with senior American officers, historic study, and his a long time of expertise in South Asia to give an explanation for and overview 3 generations of U.S. actions and guidelines towards the risky zone. "The Limits of effect" chronicles America's perspectives on-and involvement in-the long-standing fight waged among India and Pakistan over Kashmir because their independence in 1947. He brings the dialogue as much as the present day, concluding with tips on the position Washington could usefully play in resolving the long-simmering dispute, hence lowering the damaging tensions among nuclear-armed archrivals in a area of significant value. His e-book is an interesting piece of diplomatic historical past in addition to an instructive examine the current and way forward for the Kashmir predicament and its influence on very important U.S. matters.
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Extra info for The Limits of Influence: America's Role in Kashmir (Adst-Dacor Diplomats and Diplomacy)
Although Karachi also followed a nonaligned policy in 1949, this was more a matter of necessity than choice. The Pakistanis had not been shy in expressing their interest in joining the Western bloc if it would have them. Two separate conversations Ambassador Loy Henderson had in New Delhi with Bajpai and Nehru in July and August 1949 illustrate the gap in the two countries’ positions on Kashmir. S. ambassador to India in November 1948, was a confirmed cold warrior. He had little use for Indian nonalignment and saw no reason to conceal his disdain.
Formal Security Council debate on Kashmir began on January 15, 1948, when Indian representative Gopalaswami Ayyangar spelled out New Delhi’s position. He was followed by the Pakistan foreign minister, Sir Mohammed Zafrulla Khan. Both diplomats claimed that their country was the aggrieved party. For Ayyangar, the tribal invasion and Pakistan’s participation in it were the cause of the conflict. The immediate task before the council, he insisted, was the raiders’ expulsion and an end to the fighting.
Bajpai and other Indians. In an unusually tough message, it instructed him “to avoid in conversations with [Indian] officials initiating any new substantive discussions of the Kashmir case, unless instructed by the Department. ”68 In a long follow-up letter, Assistant Secretary Hickerson pointedly recalled for Bowles that when Dixon floated his idea, India quickly made clear it was not prepared to accept conditions for a plebiscite in the Valley that in Dixon’s opinion were the very minimum needed to ensure a free and fair vote.